Want us to add your blog or article?This site aggregates blogs and popular press articles about personality psychology. If you are an ARP member who writes a blog, or whose research has been featured in a recent popular press article, email us at firstname.lastname@example.org to have your work added to the meta-blog.
- Is Using Profanity a Sign of Honesty? – Scott McGreal (Unique—Like Everybody Else)
- looking under the hood – Simine Vazire (sometimes i'm wrong)
- A Most Courageous Act – Brent Roberts (pigee)
- A grad student’s review of SPSP 2017 – Carol Tweten (Person X Situation)
- The Fundamental Errors of Situationism – Scott McGreal (Unique—Like Everybody Else)
- The Fundamental Attribution Error is Overrated – Scott McGreal (Unique—Like Everybody Else)
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DisclaimerThe views expressed in blog posts and other articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Association for Research in Personality.
Category Archives: pigee
The most courageous act a modern academic can make is to say they were wrong. After all, we deal in ideas, not things. When we say we were wrong, we are saying our ideas, our products so to speak, were faulty. It is a supremely unsettling thing to do. Of course, in the Platonic ideal, and in reality, being a scientist necessitates being wrong a lot. Unfortunately, our incentive system militates against being honest about our work. Thus, countless researchers choose not to admit or even acknowledge the possibility that they might have been mistaken. In a bracingly honest post in response to a blog by Uli Schimmack, the Nobel Prize winning psychologist, Daniel Kahneman, has done the unthinkable. He has admitted that he was mistaken. Here’s a quote: Continue reading
Scientific research is an attempt to identify a working truth about the world that is as independent of ideology as possible. As we appear to be entering a time of heightened skepticism about the value of scientific information, we feel it is important to emphasize and foster research practices that enhance the integrity of scientific data and thus scientific information. We have therefore created a list of better research practices that we believe, if followed, would enhance the reproducibility and reliability of psychological science. The proposed methodological practices are applicable for exploratory or confirmatory research, and for observational or experimental methods.
- If testing a specific hypothesis, pre-register your research, so others can know that the forthcoming tests are informative. Report the planned analyses as confirmatory, and report any other analyses or any deviations from the planned analyses as exploratory.
- If conducting exploratory research, present it as exploratory. Then, document the research by posting materials, such as measures, procedures, and analytical code so future researchers can benefit from them. Also, make research expectations and plans in advance of analyses—little, if any, research is truly exploratory. State the goals and parameters of your study as clearly as possible before beginning data analysis.
- Consider data sharing options prior to data collection (e.g. Continue reading
Some of you might have missed the kerfuffle that erupted in the last few days over a pre-print of an editorial written by Susan Fiske for the APS Monitor about us “methodological terrorists”. Andrew Gelman’s blog reposts Fiske’s piece, puts it in historical context, and does a fairly good job of articulating why it is problematic beyond the terminological hyperbole that Fiske employs. We are reposting it for your edification.
The following is a hypothetical exchange between a graduate student and Professor Belfry-Roaster. The names have been changed to protect the innocent…. Budlie Bond: Professor Belfry-Roaster I was confused today in journal club when everyone started discussing power. I’ve taken my grad stats courses, but they didn’t teach us anything about power. It seemed really important. But it also seemed controversial. Can you tell me a bit more about power and why people care so much about it Prof. Belfry-Roaster: Sure, power is a very important factor in planning and evaluating research. Technically, power is defined as the long-run probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, false. Power is typically considered to be a Good Thing because, if the null is false, then you want your research to be capable of rejecting it. The higher the power of your study, the better the chances are that this will happen. The concept of power comes out of a very specific approach to significance testing pioneered by Neyman and Pearson. Continue reading
It has been unsettling to witness the seemingly endless stream of null effects emerging from numerous pre-registered direct replications over the past few months. Some of the outcomes were unsurprising given the low power of the original studies. But the truly painful part has come from watching and reading the responses from all sides. Countless words have been written discussing every nuanced aspect of definitions, motivations, and aspersions. Only one thing is missing: Direct, pre-registered replications by the authors of studies that have been the target of replications. While I am sympathetic to the fact that those who are targeted might be upset, defensive, and highly motivated to defend their ideas, the absence of any data from the originating authors is a more profound indictment of the original finding than any commentary. To my knowledge, and please correct me if I’m wrong, none of the researchers who’ve been the target of a pre-registered replication have produced a pre-registered study from their own lab showing that they are capable of getting the effect, even if others are not. For those of us standing on the sidelines watching things play out we are constantly surprised by the fact that the one piece of information that might help—evidence that the original authors are capable of reproducing their own effects (in a pre-registered study)—is never offered up. So, get on with it. Seriously. Everyone. Continue reading
One of the most provocative requests in the reproducibility crisis was Daniel Kahneman’s call for psychological scientists to collaborate on a “daisy chain” of research replication. He admonished proponents of priming research to step up and work together to replicate the classic priming studies that had, up to that point, been called into question. What happened? Nothing. Total crickets. There were no grand collaborations among the strongest and most capable labs to reproduce each other’s work. Why not? Using 20:20 hindsight it is clear that the incentive structure in psychological science militated against the daisy chain idea. The scientific system in 2012 (and the one currently still in place) rewarded people who were the first to discover a new, counterintuitive feature of human nature, preferably using an experimental method. Since we did not practice direct replications, the veracity of our findings weren’t really the point. The point was to be the discoverer, the radical innovator, the colorful, clever genius who apparently had a lot of flair. If this was and remains the reward structure, what incentive was there or is there to conduct direct replications of your own or other’s work? Continue reading
A paper on one of the most important research projects in our generation came out a few weeks ago. I’m speaking, of course, of the Reproducibility Project conducted by several hundred psychologists. It is a tour de force of good science. Most importantly, it provided definitive evidence for the state of the field. Despite the fact that 97% of the original studies reported statistically significant effects, only 36% hit the magical p < .05 mark when closely replicated. Two defenses have been raised against the effort. The first, described by some as the “move along folks, there’s nothing to see here” defense, proposes that a 36% replication rate is no big deal. It is to be expected given how tough it is to do psychological science. At one level I’m sympathetic to the argument that science is hard to do, especially psychological science. It is the case that very few psychologists have 36% of their ideas work. And, by work, I mean in the traditional sense of the word, which is to net a p value less than . Continue reading